Marcelo Carbone Ball v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-12-2012 
Marcelo Carbone Ball v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Marcelo Carbone Ball v. Attorney General United States" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 449. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/449 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
IMG-109        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1859 
 ___________ 
 
 MARCELO F. CARBONE BALL, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-384-266) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On September 5, 2012 
 
 Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: September 12, 2012) 
 _________ 
 




 The petitioner, a native and citizen of Uruguay, seeks review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his application for withholding of removal.  
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We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),
1
 reviewing the agency’s factual 
determinations using an “extraordinarily deferential standard,” under which they will be 
upheld “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.”  Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  
Having carefully examined the record, we conclude that substantial record evidence 
supports the BIA’s determination that the domestic violence endured, witnessed, and 
feared by the petitioner (and his family) was not “persecution” because it was committed 
neither by the Uruguayan government nor by forces it was unable or unwilling to control.  
Administrative Record (A.R.) 4–5; Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).2  
The petitioner testified that the Uruguayan police were responsive to his family’s 
complaints against his abusive father, if not to the extent he desired.  A.R. 123–25, 135.  
The various country reports submitted to the agency, while equivocal, can be plausibly 
                                                 
1
 We agree with the Government that we lack jurisdiction to address the petitioner’s 
asylum and Convention Against Torture claims, which were alternately unexhausted and 
waived.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Khan v. Att’y Gen., No. 11-1789, 2012 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16946, at *14 n.4 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) 
(limiting judicial review of asylum untimeliness determinations).  
 
2
 Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2005), which also dealt with horrific 
domestic abuse, is distinguishable from the present situation.  There, we observed that the 
BIA had “totally ignored the evidence in the record that establishes the deep hold that the 
Trokosi religion has upon substantial elements of the Ghanian people,” and pointed out 
that it was not “easy to escape from Trokosi slavery.”  Id. at 161.  Furthermore, the “most 
recent State Department Report covering Ghana show[ed] how futile resort to the police 
would have been.”  Id.  Here, not only does the record not compel a conclusion of 
hypothetical police noninterference in domestic-violence situations, the police did 
actually intervene upon a formal complaint.  While a different evidentiary proffer could 
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read to support the BIA’s conclusion that the official Uruguayan response to domestic 
violence, while achieving “mixed results,” reflects the country’s “efforts to criminalize 
such acts and to protect the victims.”  A.R. 6.  “Where the record supports plausible but 
conflicting inferences in an immigration case, the . . . choice between those inferences is, 
a fortiori, supported by substantial evidence.”  De Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 
219 (1st Cir. 2007).  Because the agency’s decision is sustainable on this ground, we need 
not reach its alternative holdings and the petitioner’s arguments against them.  This 
petition for review will be denied. 
                                                                                                                                                             
nudge this case closer to Fiadjoe, on the record before the agency, which must be the 
basis of our ruling, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), we cannot say that Fiadjoe controls.  
